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This is an introductory textbook in the philosophy of mathematics. It is intended for 
advanced undergraduates and graduate students in philosophy as well as 
mathematicians and others interested in the foundations of mathematics. Is it a 
good book? Well that all depends upon what standards you apply. I’ll return to this 
(far from trivial) issue shortly. But before I do, you’ll need to have a sense of what’s 
between the covers. 
 Øystein Linnebo’s Philosophy of Mathematics has twelve chapters varying 
between nine and seventeen pages in length; there are four pages of concluding 
remarks. (The book has wide margins so the pages are relatively short). The first 
chapter sets the agenda for the rest, laying out “the philosophical challenge” which 
mathematics has posed for us “ever since the beginning of Western philosophy” (4), 
the challenge of explaining how we can be reliable indicators of mathematical truths 
if they’re necessary, a priori and their subject matter is abstract; the challenge and 
the space of potential solutions to the challenge are framed in terms which Linnebo 
ascribes to Plato and Kant. The next seven chapters cover topics which, Linnebo 
judges, “tend to be included in any good course in the philosophy of mathematics” 
(3). Chapter two is devoted to assessing Frege’s logicism, whilst chapter three deals 
with formalism and deductivism, as distinguished from Hilbert’s Programme, which 
is the the topic of chapter four. Chapter five discusses intuitionism, chapter six Mill 
and Quine’s respective empiricist approaches to mathematics, and chapter seven is 
concerned with nominalism, in particular Field’s programme. The remaining five 
chapters are intended by the author to be “more specialised and somewhat more 
demanding, both mathematically and philosophically” (3). Chapter eight discusses 
mathematical intuition as a putative source of evidence for mathematical truth, 
touching, inter alia, upon the views of Gödel and Maddy. Chapter nine (“Abstraction 
Reconsidered”) is about attempts to revive a recognisable version of Frege’s 
logicism after the Contradiction, including versions advanced by Hale and Wright, as 
well as Linnebo himself. Chapter ten deals with the iterative conception of set, 
chapter eleven discusses structuralism in its various eliminative, non-eliminative, 
and modal guises and chapter twelve the quest for new axioms, i.e. the kind of 
evidence we can have for adding new axioms to mathematics. The concluding 
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remarks at the end of the book provide a summary of the key lessons learnt.   
 Back to the question: is it a good book? Obviously a good introductory book 
shouldn’t be judged by the same standards as a good monograph; they’re meant to 
do different things. Whereas we expect an exemplar of the latter kind to push 
forward the frontiers of the discipline, we expect an exemplar of the former to fulfil 
its telos by helping draw a new generation of students into the philosophical 
conversation, enabling them to enter into dialogue with us. We don’t mind if the 
arguments of such a book are sketchy or a little simplified, so long as they provide 
the novice with the inspiration or the intellectual leg-up that facilitates her/him 
having her/his say in the to and fro, because that’s the end result that matters for an 
introductory book. This means the standards for text books in philosophy should be 
high, in the relevant sense, because when they’re good they play an important role 
in our passing on the torch, enabling others to think for themselves and having the 
confidence to develop their own views. This is especially so given that Philosophy 
as a discipline fails to be socially inclusive, the fact that so relatively few of us are 
women, minority ethnic, working class, disabled and so on. We need to find ways of 
enabling more of the socially excluded. You might reply: you can’t expect Linnebo 
to tackle social inclusion, or rather the lack of it, in a textbook on the philosophy of 
mathematics! That’s too big an ask. But each time a student from a minority group 
is inspired and understands more, so she/he feels more confident to engage in the 
philosophical conversation, it’s a small victory for social inclusion. So good 
introductory books can make a difference because enough small victories add up.  
 How then does Linnebo’s book fare by this standard: how likely is it that it 
will succeed in helping enable students that don’t already have a grasp of the topics 
it covers to understand and develop facility with the ideas and arguments 
addressed in the book? In particular, how likely is it that this book will help enable 
students that aren’t already confident about their ability to come to such a happy 
state? On the one hand, Linnebo maps out a lot of territory in clear and succinct 
prose. Whilst Linnebo has his own distinctive views and does not seek to hide them, 
many of the points he makes reflect if not the consensus understanding, at least a 
way of understanding the issues commonly to be found in the literature. So students 
that have the confidence to feel they understand and can run with an idea even 
when it’s only explained cursorily to them, they are going to learn a lot about the lie 
of the land in contemporary philosophy of mathematics from reading this book. Of 
course there will be some students that satisfy this description. This book will be 
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good for them, especially some of the later chapters that touch on subjects that are 
rarely treated in an introductory guise. That’s a good enough thing, enough to make 
an introductory book worthwhile, because we shouldn’t expect a one-size-fits-all 
rule for introductory books—because students vary, as lecturers and instructors 
vary too. But, on the other hand, I think there will be many students that don’t feel 
able to take on ideas that are explained so cursorily because they won’t already be 
confident enough about the subject matter to take on board what Linnebo is 
saying—clearly and succinctly perhaps to us but, I suspect, all too briefly to them. 
For them, the ones that it’s so important for us to enable, this book is more of a map 
than a guidebook, because it covers so much territory. And the problem with a map 
is that it presupposes an independent ability to navigate by it.  
 Let me provide some examples of what I mean. Consider chapter nine, 
“Abstraction Reconsidered”. It’s only twelve pages long but covers the simple 
theory of types, neo-fregean abstractionism and Linnebo’s own preferred “dynamic 
abstraction” approach. Inevitably this mean the pace is very brisk. Take the 
discussion of the Caesar problem. Background: Hume’s Principle (HP) says that the 
number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs iff the Fs and the Gs can be put in 
one-one correspondence: #xFx = #xGx  ↔ F ≈ G. Linnebo devotes the following 
three sentences to articulating the problem. 
 
“While (HP) gives us a handle on all identity statements of the form ‘#xFx = #xGx  ↔ 
F ≈ G’, the principle is silent on mixed identity statements such as ‘#xFx = Julius 
Caesar’. Perhaps we know that all such statements are false; but if so that is no 
thanks to (HP). This is known as the Caesar problem” (133). 
 
Of course for those of us that are already familiar with the problem this constitutes 
an effective statement of it. But if you’re not already familiar with it, I suspect this is 
likely to flash by all too quickly. From experience teaching the Caesar problem, 
students typically ask: What’s a “mixed identity statement”? Do I know that all such 
statements are false? What has this got to do with Julius Caesar? Why does any of 
this matter anyway? Students aren’t going to be able to answer these questions on 
the basis of the three sentences provided here.  
I have similar reservations about the only proposed solution that Linnebo 
considers to the Caesar problem, presented in just the four following sentences,  
 
“Hale and Wright propose a solution based on a simple but powerful idea. When we 
learn that a criterion of identity applies to an object, we learn something about an 
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object, namely that it has a certain property. So when a criterion of identity applies 
to one object but not to another, the former object has a property that the other 
lacks. It follows by Leibniz’s Law that the objects are distinct. While the details 
obviously need to be spelled out, this is a promising beginning” (133). 
 
Again I think this will be too brisk for many students. For example, Linnebo doesn’t 
explain why he thinks this is “a promising beginning”. Nor does he explain why he 
thinks this should help settle the kind of mixed identity statements mentioned in the 
preceding excerpt. This proposed solution to the Caesar problem is inherently 
questionable anyway, at least as Linnebo presents it. Appealing to criteria of identity 
is meant to solve the Caesar problem but the proposed solution makes appeal to 
criteria of identity redundant. If we are to know that a given criterion C applies to x 
but not to y we must already be in a position to ascertain both (i) that there is 
something about x, suppose this to be some feature J, in virtue of which C applies 
to x, and (ii) that there is no corresponding feature of y, and that’s why C doesn’t 
apply to it. Now grant for the sake of argument that we can learn something else 
about x in virtue of the fact that it satisfies C, namely that it is K as well as J, 
because whatever satisfies C is also K. But we only learn this new thing about x in a 
context where we have already distinguished x from y, by the fact that x is J but y 
isn’t. So the appeal to identity criteria isn’t actually playing a role distinguishing x 
from y; we settle their numerical difference before C comes into play.  
There’s an even more serious objection to be made. I don’t think this is a 
promising solution because it’s question begging and reflects a failure to grasp the 
nature of the Caesar problem itself. The Caesar problem arises because (HP) settles 
so little about the nature of numbers, leaves so much open; (HP) tells us what it is 
for two things identified as numbers (as #xFx and #xGx) to be the same or different 
(F ≈ G or not) but is silent about what it takes for a thing to be a number that isn’t 
already identified as such. So we cannot logically wring from it that even (e.g.) a 
man like Caesar isn’t a number. As a result we’re not even in a position to settle 
whether (HP) conceived as a criterion of identity applies to Caesar or not. At any 
rate I was baffled, and I suspect students will be baffled, by the idea that Hale and 
Wright can so easily dispense with the Caesar problem, because then it’s unclear 
why the Caesar problem should have been worth taking seriously in the first place. 
Hale and Wright hold that (HP) is capable of serving as an a priori foundation 
for mathematics, an abstraction principle which introduces us to numbers. They 
face what is often called the “Bad Company” objection, although surprisingly this 
label isn’t used in this book. It’s the objection, roughly speaking, that (HP) shares its 
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logical form with other abstraction principles that are demonstrably bad in one 
respect or other, such as Frege’s Axiom V which purports to introduce extensions 
as logical objects but leads to outright contradiction, so we need an account of 
what makes (HP) good (if it is) and distinguishes it from other bad principles of a 
similar form. After briefly outlining this demarcation problem for Hale and Wright’s 
approach, Linnebo devotes the final section of chapter nine to his own “Dynamic 
Abstraction” approach, which is meant to help us leap free from the Bad Company 
objection. The radical thought here is that the bad abstraction principles aren’t bad 
after all, not so long as we avoid the assumption that they involve quantification over 
a fixed domain of objects that already includes the extensions etc. introduced by 
them. Instead, Linnebo argues, we can avoid the prima facie badness of the bad 
principles by conceiving of an abstraction principle as resulting in “‘new’ objects 
that lie outside of the ‘old’ domain with which we began” (136). Dummett famously 
argued that we cannot quantify over all the objects falling under certain concepts, 
such as number or extension, what he called indefinitely extensible concepts, on 
pain of contradiction, as the paradoxes have taught us (see, for example, 
Dummett’s Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, Duckworth, 1991, p. 316). If we can 
form a definite conception of a totality of objects falling under an indefinitely 
extensible concept then by reference to that totality we can characterize an even 
more encompassing totality of them but never a definite totality of all of the objects 
falling under the aforementioned concept. It seems clear that there are significant 
connections between Linnebo’s dynamic abstraction approach and what Dummett 
says about indefinite extensibility. But indefinite extensibility isn’t discussed in this 
book. This seems a serious omission.  
Here is another example of my general pedagogical theme. In chapter 
eleven, which discusses a variety of different forms of structuralism, Linnebo 
devotes one section to an examination of non-eliminative structuralism, the doctrine 
which Linnebo describes in terms of taking abstract structure talk ontologically 
seriously, i.e. conceiving abstract structures as if they were objects in their own 
right. Actually I think it is questionable to describe non-eliminative structuralism tout 
court in such terms; for example, Resnik cautions us against automatically taking 
the step from conceiving certain kinds of object as positions in patterns to 
conceiving patterns themselves as objects (see his Mathematics as a Science of 
Patterns, Clarendon, 1997, pp. 246-7). But put that point aside. Linnebo goes onto 
maintain that it is a distinctive feature of non-eliminative structuralism that 
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mathematical objects from the same structure have a special kind of “ontological 
dependency” upon each other and the structure to which they belong. Linnebo 
doesn’t explain to the reader the relevant notion of ontological dependency he has 
in mind. In fact when he comes to explain the relationship between a given 
mathematical object and the structure to which it belongs he does so in terms of 
essence rather than ontological dependence, the latter notion then cashed out by 
him in terms of existence and necessity.  
 
“According to this dependence claim, as I shall call it, the essence of a natural 
number lies in its relations to other natural numbers. As a mere position in this 
structure, it would not exist without that structure, nor could the structure exist 
without its other positions” (164).  
 
Linnebo characterizes this as “an attractive explication of the non-eliminative 
structuralist view that mathematical objects are mere positions in patterns” (164). 
But he doesn’t explain what makes this “attractive” qua explication nor indeed what 
it means to provide an “explication” in the present context. So the reader is left 
adrift, especially because “explication” is often used in a more demanding technical 
sense in the philosophy of mathematics.  
Certainly Linnebo’s description of non-eliminative structuralism uses the very 
terms and ideas that Shapiro, a leading non-eliminative structuralist, used to 
express the doctrine that mathematical objects are mere positions in patterns 
(Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics, OUP, 2000, p. 258, quoted by Linnebo). But 
because they’re so close, Linnebo’s characterization of Shapiro’s views can hardly 
serve as an “explication” of them in anything but the loosest of senses. The more 
interesting issue is whether a philosophical theory couched in terms of ontological 
dependence can constitute an attractive explication of a mathematical theory in the 
more demanding sense often found in the philosophy of mathematics. Carnap, 
drawing upon Frege and Russell, wrote, “an explication replaces the imprecise 
explicandum by a more precise explicatum” (Carnap “Replies and Systematic 
Exposition” in P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, 1962, 
p. 935). If that’s the standard then it is hard to see how a theory couched in terms of 
ontological dependence or essence can be an attractive explication. The problem, 
as I see it, is that the notions of “ontological dependence” and “essence” are 
metaphysicians’ notions. They’re foreign to mathematical practice and far less 
precise and far harder to define than the notions mathematicians typically employ 
themselves. So if the goal is to explicate the less precise and the less well-defined in 
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terms of the more precise and the better understood—or at least something close to 
that goal—then mathematics cannot be explicated in terms of the obscure notion of 
ontological dependence. At the beginning of Philosophy of Mathematics, Linnebo 
warns his reader against “rational metaphysics, which for centuries professed to 
deliver insights into the ultimate nature of reality and ourselves, based solely on 
reason” (4). (I’m assuming that “rational metaphysics”, a relatively unusual 
expression, covers rationalist metaphysics—the term may confuse students). 
Linnebo reflects, “in stark contrast to rational metaphysics, mathematics is a 
paradigm of a solid and successful science” (5). So I imagine that Linnebo would 
agree with me that it would be a mistake to explain or explicate mathematics in 
terms of rational metaphysics. Now the notion of ontological dependence may have 
its source in Aristotle rather than Leibniz but Aristotelian metaphysics is shaky and 
precarious compared to the rock of mathematics too. So I think it would be no less 
a mistake to explain or explicate mathematics in terms of notions drawn from 
Aristotelian metaphysics, such as ontological dependence.1  	
																																																								1	Thanks to Marianna Antonutti, Chris Daly and Frédérique Janssen-Lauret for 
comments.	
